I. Introduction
An inevitable consequence of the growth of the "knowledge" or "information" economy is the increased importance of instruments designed to protect the property rights associated with these intangibles. Chief among the formal means of such protection is the patent, defined as the legal right of an inventor to exclude others from making or using a particular invention. This right is customarily limited in time, to 20 years from the date of application submission in most countries. The principle behind the modern patent is that an inventor is allowed a limited amount of time to exclude others from supplying or using an invention in order to encourage inventive activity by preventing immediate imitation. In return, the inventor is required to make the description and implementation of the invention public rather than keeping it secret, allowing others to build more easily on the knowledge contained in his invention.
Given the increased salience of intellectual property rights broadly and especially of patents to firms competing in the knowledge economy, it is perhaps not surprising that this increase has been accompanied by increased criticism and controversy over the functioning of patent systems throughout the world. In fact, a number of government and quasi-governmental agencies have issued reports calling for patent reform in the very recent past, in some cases as part of a broader agenda of Intellectual Property Rights reform. 2 The recommendations offered have ranged from 1 University of California at Berkeley and University of Maastricht. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
procedural reforms specific to individual jurisdictions all the way to calls for reductions in the enforcement of the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement in developing countries. 3 They include recommendations that patent and IPR policy operate in tandem with competition policy, that impediments to basic scientific research using patented inputs be reduced, and that the patent systems in individual countries and regions work toward harmonization in order to reduce the transactions costs of the system. This article sets the stage for a discussion of current trends in patenting and patent policy with a brief history and guide to the current operation of patent systems around the world. It then reviews the economic rationale for patents and the evidence that patents provide or do not provide appropriate incentives for innovation. I then discuss why the system has been under strain recently and review the arguments for various policy reforms.
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II. A brief history and guide
Patents have a long history, although some of the earliest patents are simply the grant of a legal monopoly in a particular good rather than protection of an invention from imitation. Early examples of technology-related patents are Brunelleschi's patent on a boat designed to carry marble up the Arno River, issued by the Florentine government in 1421, the Venetian patent law of 1474, and various patent monopolies granted by the English crown between the 15th and 17th centuries. The modern patent, which requires a working model or written description of an invention, dates from the 18th century, first in Britain (1718) and then in the United States (1790), followed closely by France (in both the latter two cases one of the consequences of a revolution). 5 Many other Continental European countries introduced patents during the 19th century, as did Japan (JPO, 2006) and India (James, 2007) . During the 20th century, the use of patent systems became almost universal and the signing of the TRIPS agreement has ensured that all countries who are members of the World Trade Organization will have at least a minimal level of patent protection.
In 1883 the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property guaranteed national treatment of patent applicants from any country that was a party to it. Its most important provision gave applicants who were nationals or residents of one member state the right to file an For an excellent contemporary survey of the impact of changes in IP on management and strategy, see Ziedonis (2007) . Ladas and Parry (2003) . See also the EPO and USPTO websites (EPO, 2007a and USPTO, 2007) . application in their own country and then, as long as an application was filed in another country that was a member of the treaty within a specified time (now 12 months) to have the date of filing in the home country count as the effective filing date in that other country (the 'priority date'). This is an important feature of the patent system, as it enables worldwide priority to be obtained for an invention originating in any one country, in addition to ensuring that in principle all inventors are treated equally by the system, regardless of the country from which they come.
Although the process for granting a patent varies slightly according to the jurisdiction for which protection is desired, the adoption of the TRIPS agreement in 1995 ensures that it is approximately the same everywhere in the world. This agreement requires its member countries to make patent protection available for any product or process invention in any field of technology with only a few specified exceptions. It also requires them to make the term of protection available for not less than a period of 20 years from the date of filing the patent application.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has almost 200 member states and lists an equivalent number of national patent offices and industrial property offices on its website. In general, the patent right extends only within the border of the jurisdiction that has granted it (usually but not always a country). An important exception to the one country-one state rule is the European system, where it is possible to file a patent application at the European Patent Office (EPO) that will become a set of national patent rights in several European countries at the time of issue (EPO, 2006) . A similar situation exists with respect to the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO). The exact number and choice of countries is under control of the applicant. Patents granted by the EPO have the same legal status as patents granted by the various national offices that are party to the European Patent Convention (EPC).
The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) came into existence in 1978, and now has 133 countries as contracting signatories. Any resident or national of a contracting state of the PCT may file an international application under the PCT that specifies the office which should conduct the search. The PCT application serves as an application filed in each designated contracting state. However, in order to obtain patent protection in a particular state, a patent needs to be granted by that state to the claimed invention contained in the international application. The advantage of a PCT application is that fewer searches need to be conducted and the process is therefore less expensive. Thus, although application and search are to some extent standardized across offices, grants are not. In fact, 87 per cent of the PCT applications go to one of three patent offices for search: those in the United States, Europe, and Japan (WIPO 2007) . Most of the other systems rely on them for the search process and follow them in a number of other areas. Therefore much of what follows focuses on these three major systems.
Many patent offices have a provision for challenging patents following their issue. In the United States, any third party may request re-examination of a patent during its lifetime, although for various reasons related to potential subsequent litigation this opportunity is rarely taken up. 6 In Europe and Japan, robust patent opposition systems with limited time frames operate, and these systems are often used by rival firms as an alternative to more expensive litigation Harhoff and Reitzig 2004) . In Europe this avenue of challenge is particularly attractive because it is the last opportunity to attack the validity of a patent at the European-wide level rather than in individual national courts.
Patents are valuable only if they can be enforced and this fact has a number of implications for their use. First, the ability of the courts to reach the 'correct' verdict with respect to infringement and validity will matter; in situations or jurisdictions where there is a great deal of uncertainty about the outcome, and even if both parties agree as to the merits of the case, it may be worthwhile for one or both of them to pursue the issue further or in some cases, to reach a private financial settlement to avoid a random outcome in the courts.
7 Second, the costs of litigation will matter: parties with deep pockets can threaten those with less access to financial resources, or where the opportunity cost of paying attention to a patent suit is high, as in small entrepreneurial firms. On the other hand, smaller parties with little to lose can also hold up firms with large sunk investments at risk (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) . Finally, the threat of litigation may discourage firms from even entering certain areas, thus providing a disincentive rather than an incentive for R&D. Lerner (1995) documented this phenomenon for biotechnology.
The degree to which these kinds of threats matter depends to a great extent on the costs and extent of litigation, both of which tend to be higher in the United States than in many other countries. However, there are signs that concerns about litigation cost have been increasing elsewhere, notably in Europe where there is active debate over proposals to reduce enforcement costs by creating a supranational patent court system of some kind. At the time of writing, the current proposal, which is the European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA), has not yet been ratified by enough countries to make it legally binding. EPO (2006) gives the rationale for such an agreement along with some estimates of patent litigation cost in Europe and EPO (2007b) reports on the current state of all legislative initiatives in Europe.
Research on patent litigation is difficult because of the data collection problem (it frequently requires accessing the records of courts in several different jurisdictions) but in recent years there have been series of studies of US patent litigation (Moore, 2000; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Bessen and Meurer, 2005) and at least one of the German system (Cremers, 2004) . All of these studies document the fact that litigated patents tend to be the more valuable patents, as one might have expected. The US studies also show that only about five per cent of such suits go to trial, with the remainder being settled before going to trial. They also show that whether patent 6 Users of this procedure are estopped from raising any issues of validity that might have been raised in reexamination in subsequent litigation. In practice, fewer than one per cent of U.S. patents are re-examed, and almost half of those re-exams are requested by the patentholder or the USPTO itself .
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See Farrell and Shapiro (2007) for detailed models of this process. litigation has increased depends on whether it is measured in aggregate or per patent. That is, the increase in patent litigation has roughly paralleled the increase in patenting, at least in the United States, although there is some indication that the litigation rate has risen in the very recent past (Bessen and Meurer, 2005) .
III. Do patents encourage innovation?
The economic view of patents is that they offer a bargain between society and the inventor: in return for a limited period of exclusivity, the inventor agrees to make his invention public rather than keeping it secret. Two questions immediately arise from this: first, what is the optimal design of such a policy instrument? And second, are patents effective at accomplishing this task? Much of recent economic research on patents has been directed to attempting to answer these questions and has found that the trade off between a "short-term monopoly" and "innovation incentive" is much more complex than the usual textbook treatment, making the optimal design problem extremely difficult. Table 1 presents a framework for thinking about the costs and benefits of the patent system in two dimensions, innovation and competition. The on-diagonal boxes represent the traditional trade off between negative effects for competition arising from market power and the positive effects for innovation, while the shaded off-diagonals represent newer views of the ways in which patents might actually discourage innovation but enable and encourage competition. Thus this chart suggests that in addition to the familiar arguments that patents increase innovation via incentive effects and diffusion and decrease competition because they create temporary monopolies, there are offsetting effects in both cases, effects that have become more apparent in recent years. 8 These offsetting effects are the tendency of patents to increase the costs of subsequent innovators, especially when these innovators need to combine inventions from many sources, as well as the fact that patents may help competition by facilitating the vertical disintegration of knowledge-intensive industries and helping new entrants. The next two sections of the article review the evidence, both theoretical and empirical, on the effectiveness of the current patent systems in achieving its goals. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical literature on optimal design of innovation incentive systems.
(i) Theoretical evidence
As is often the case with models that admit the complexity of the world, the theoretical literature in this area produces ambiguous results with respect to incentives provided by patents. In the simplest case, where a patent corresponds to a single product and knowledge is not particularly cumulative, it is clear that patents will encourage innovation. Offering individuals the short-term right to exclude others from practicing an invention provides them with the opportunity to earn rents or supranormal profits when they innovate that are higher than those they would earn if there were immediate free entry into imitation of their invention.
The early theoretical industrial organization literature on patent races even seemed to suggest that patents produced too much innovation (Wright, 1983; Reinganum, 1989) . However, models that incorporate the cumulative nature of innovation or dispersed ownership of the patents required for producing a new good yield more ambiguous results (Judd, 1985; Scotchmer 1991; Bessen and Maskin, 2006) . A modest theoretical literature pioneered by Scotchmer (1991) has developed that analyzes a number of such models. Two main cases and their variations have been considered: those where two innovative stages are required to produce the product (the "research tool" case) and those where there is a sequence of products each of which is an improvement over the previous product (the cumulative or "quality ladder" case). In either case, it is possible that any particular invention uses one or more other inventions as input or is an input to one or more future inventions. This type of analysis has increased in importance because of the complexity of modern technology and also because of growth in patent use in sectors that traditionally had regarded patent protection as relatively unimportant. Briefly described, the new setting is one where a single product involves hundreds of patents, and where one innovation 8 This is not to say that these effects have gone completely unrecognized in the past. Consider the following quotation from a sugar manufacturer in Great Britain during the 19 th century: "In the manufacture with which I am connected -the sugar trade -there are somewhere like 300 or 400 patents. Now, how are we to know all these 400 patents? How are we to manage continually, in the natural process of making improvements in manufacture, to know which of these patents we are at any time conflicting with? So far as I know, we are not violating any patent; but really, if we are to be exceedingly earnest in the question, probably we would require to have a highly paid clerk in London continually analysing the various patents; and every year, by the multiplication of patents, this difficulty is becoming more formidable." [Macfie, R.A., quoted builds directly on many others. Neither feature is really new, but both have assumed increasing importance in a number of technology areas such as information technology and biotechnology.
When development of an innovative product requires multiple patent inputs, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) have argued forcefully that the licensing solution may fail because of transactions costs if a large number of patentholders are involved. One consequence of this fragmentation threat may be increased defensive patenting by the product developer in order to be able to threaten a countersuit if attacked. Empirical evidence for this proposition has been provided by Ziedonis (2004) in the context of the semiconductor industry.
A recent paper by Bessen and Maskin (2006) develops a model of sequential (cumulative) and complementary innovation in a differentiated product setting and analyzes the effect of patent protection in two settings, nonsequential and infinitely sequential (that is, where each invention builds on the preceding invention). The results are somewhat complex but intuitive: in the static nonsequential case, having patents generally yields higher welfare than not having them. But in the fully sequential case, the equilibrium without patents has higher welfare and innovation than the equilibrium with patents if the upper tail of the distribution of innovation values is sufficiently thick. They show that the two commonly used distributions for innovation value, lognormal and Pareto, satisfy this condition. 9 They also show that in some cases, even the original innovator may benefit from the absence of patents in the dynamic case, because he receives spillovers from follow-on innovation. Empirical evidence that suggests some positive value to this kind of spillover has been offered recently by Belenzon (2006) using sequences of patent citations to measure knowledge flows in and out of the firm.
(ii) Empirical evidence
The question posed in the beginning of this section has also proved difficult to answer empirically, largely because of the absence of real experiments, at least since the nineteenth century. Some researchers have looked at historical eras when there were changes to the system and examined the consequences for subsequent innovative activity, measured either by patenting in a jurisdiction not affected by the changes to the system or by invention counts obtained independently (Lerner, 2002; Moser, 2005) . A second widely used approach is to survey firm managers, asking about their patent use and the use of patents in their industry (Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2002; Arundel, 2003) . Using these kinds of survey data matched to R&D spending and innovation outcomes, more econometric model-based approaches have been pursued by Baldwin, Hanl and Sabourin, 2000; Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen, 2003; and Bloom, Van Reenen and Schankerman, 2005, among others. 9 Grabowski and Vernon (1994), Hall et al. (2005) , and Harhoff et al. (1999) provide evidence on the distribution of innovation and patent value.
A few conclusions have emerged from this body of work. First, introducing or strengthening a patent system (lengthening the patent term, broadening subject matter coverage or available scope, improving enforcement) unambiguously results in an increase in patenting and also in the use of patents as a tool of firm strategy (Lerner, 2002; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) . This is to be expected, but it is much less clear that these changes result in an increase in innovative activity (Lerner 2002; Baldwin et al., 2000) , although they may redirect such activity toward things that are patentable and away from those than can be kept secret within the firm (Moser, 2005) . Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) studied the effects of expanding patent scope by allowing multiple claims in Japan in 1988 and found that this change to the patent system had a very small effect on R&D activity in Japanese firms.
An exception to this conclusion are two studies based on cross country data: Park and Ginarte (1997) and Kanwar and Evenson (2003) . Park and Ginarte (1997) uses aggregate data for 60 countries during from and an index of the strength of IP rights (subject matter coverage, term length, etc.) which they developed. Using a simultaneous equations model of economic growth, investment, schooling, and R&D investment, they found that the strength of IP rights was positively associated with investment and R&D investment in countries with above median income but not for the less-developed countries. IP rights had no independent effect on growth above and beyond that contributed by investment and R&D. However, Park and Ginarte (1997) also shows that the strength of IP rights in high income countries (but not in low income countries) can be predicted by prior R&D intensity, which raises some questions about the simultaneity of IP protection and a country's orientation towards R&D and innovation. That is, it is possible that the demand for IP protection increases when a large share of the industrial base is engaged in innovative activities.
The study by Kanwar and Evenson (2003) looks at the variation across country in R&D spending as a function of the Ginarte-Park index over the 1981-1995 period and finds similar results, with stronger IP protection related to higher R&D intensity. Although well done in many respects, this study makes no attempt to explore the potential endogeneity of the relationship nor does it control for the level of development of the countries, which arguably drives both R&D and the development of IP institutions.
In contrast to the two results cited above, Qian (2007) performs a similar analysis for pharmaceutical patents in 85 countries over the 1978-1999 period, but using matched sampling and also fixed country effect estimators. She finds that national patent protection does not stimulate domestic innovation activities, except at higher development levels, and that above a certain level of patent protection, innovation activities are actually reduced.
A third finding from the empirical literature is that if there is an increase in innovation due to patents, it is likely to be centered in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical instrument areas, and possibly specialty chemicals. This conclusion relies mostly on survey evidence from a number of countries which shows rather conclusively that patents are not among the important means to appropriate returns to innovation, except perhaps in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and some specialty chemicals (Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2001; Arora et al., 2001) . Using a structural model that combines survey responses with accounting data on R&D, Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen (2003) found that increasing the patent premium, which they define as the difference in payoffs to patented and unpatented inventions, can be expected to increase R&D in most manufacturing sectors, with the greatest increase in medical instruments, followed by biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.
Fourth and finally, the existence and strength of the patent system affects the organization of industry, by allowing trade in knowledge, which facilitates the vertical disintegration of knowledge-based industries and the entry of new firms that possess only intangible assets (Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Arora et al 2003; Arora and Merges 2004) . The argument is that, by creating a strong property right for the intangible asset, the patent system enables activities that formerly had to be kept within the firm because of secrecy and contracting problems to move out into separate entities. Although limited, research in this area supports this conclusion in the chemical and semiconductor industries.
Thus the bottom line from the empirical evidence is that the patent system provides clear incentives for innovation in only a few sectors, but that firms and industries do respond to its presence, both by making use of the system and by sometimes tailoring their innovative strategies to its presence. As Edith Penrose said in 1951 when speaking to the same question, "If national patent laws did not exist, it would be difficult to make a conclusive case for introducing them; but the fact that they do exist shifts the burden of proof and it is equally difficult to make a really conclusive case for abolishing them."
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One possible interpretation of this quote is that history matters, in the sense that industrial organization and firms adapt themselves to the institutional regime in which they find themselves and changing this regime, whatever it is, involves substantial short term costs that may not be outweighed by the long term benefits.
IV. Optimal patent design
As has been noted by many others (e. g., Wright, 1983; Shavell and van Ypserele, 2001) , there are alternative means of providing incentives for innovation, such as prizes or research contracts, but these tend to be of limited value when the goal of the inventive activity is unknown or hard to identify ex ante. See Scotchmer (2005, Chapter 2) for an excellent discussion of the alternative incentive systems.
The seminal work on optimal patent design was Nordhaus (1969) , which considered two policy instruments: the length of the patent term and the breadth of the patent, that is, the range or scope of the inventions covered. The broader the scope of a patent, the larger the number of competing products and processes that will infringe the patent, and the larger the market power of the
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The Economics of the International Patent System (1951).
patentholder. The greater the length of a patent, the longer the period over which the firm can earn monopoly profits. Later work by Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) built on and extended his method of analysis. Unfortunately, even though all three sets of authors simplified the problem by assuming that a patent corresponds to a product and that there is no uncertainty, the welfare conclusions still turn on assumptions about the nature of the product market (how competitive it is) and the existence of close substitutes for the patented product. The principal conclusion from this line of work is that optimal patent design is likely to depend on the nature of the product market and the technology, which is inconsistent with long-standing practice and policy in most patent systems. Historically, the only important exception to the homogeneous treatment of technologies is the extreme one of excluding some of them (such as pharmaceutical products, medical practices, or disembodied software, at various times and in various countries) completely from the system.
The design of patent-based incentive systems has now been extended in two directions: the first looks at the sequential innovation problem and the second focuses on incentive compatible schemes for eliciting the private information of inventors about value. Green and Scotchmer (1995) analyze the case of sequential innovation with two innovators, showing that it is difficult if not impossible to set incentives at the correct level for both the first and subsequent innovators. In general, they find that ex ante agreements between the two innovators have the potential to enhance innovation, and that in the case where the first technology is basic, ex ante agreements are welfare enhancing because they allow profit to be transferred to the first innovator. This in turn compensates him for the shortened patent life and allows the overall patent life can be kept as short as feasible given the need for both innovators to cover their costs. Of course, the difficulty with this analytic setup is the fact that subsequent innovators can rarely be identified at the time the first innovation is undertaken.
O' Donoghue et al. (1998) study the length-breadth tradeoff in the sequential innovation case with licensing. In this case, follow-on innovations can shorten the effective life of a patent, so length and breadth are interrelated rather than being two separate policy tools. They find that very broad but finite-lived patents improve innovation and diffusion but that long and narrow patents (which are easily displaced by similar but not identical inventions) can lower R&D costs by encouraging effort toward larger innovative steps.
A promising line of work in this area is the development of incentive-compatible patent renewal or compulsory licensing mechanisms designed to elicit information from inventors about the true value of their innovation (at least approximately). These models assume both that there is uncertainty ex ante about value and the R&D effort that will be undertaken and that the inventor has more information about value ex post. Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) show that in this case, it is optimal for the government to offer firms a menu of patent lives and associated lumpsum patent fees. When there is no post-patent learning by the firm, this mechanism is equivalent to offering a schedule of annual renewal fees. Even in the usual case where the value of the invention is revealed over time, renewal fees may be a useful mechanism for encouraging the release of inventions into the public domain. Using simulation, Cornelli and Schankerman show that existing patent renewal fee schedules rise much too slowly with patent life given the likely distribution of invention value. Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001) showed that such a scheme may be dominated by a menu that trades off the breadth and length of a patent, with the inventors of more fertile innovations choosing to receive broader but shorter patents. However, because of the difficulty of producing a workable definition of breadth in practice, this idea is far more difficult to implement than a set of menus involving only renewal fees and patent terms. Recently Hopenhayn et al. (2007) have developed a more complex information-revelation scheme in the setting where innovation is cumulative.
V. Recent Patenting trends (i) Policy changes
As with (almost) all governmental institutions, patent systems have evolved and continue to evolve, in ways that are ultimately driven by forces related both to a perception of increased global competition, especially in knowledge-intensive sectors, and also to technological change itself. Such changes as the expansion of subject matter coverage, strengthening of enforcement systems, and the encouragement of patenting by upstream actors can all be seen as driven by these forces. As is often the case with innovation, it is also true that many of the changes in patenting strategy observed around the world have originated in the United States and then diffused elsewhere, both via imitation and also via the process of intergovernmental negotiation. This section of the paper discusses these trends and their implications.
Unfortunately (from the perspective of optimal policy), many of the changes in patent policy in the United States during the past two decades have been as a result of court decisions, especially those of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit (CAFC), and to a lesser extent by the Supreme Court. Addressed as they are to the features of individual cases, these decisions do not always consider the broader policy implications as they set precedents. As a result of a series of court decisions by these bodies, the subject matter eligible for patenting has been extended to new technologies (biotechnology), technologies previously not subject to patent protection (business methods, software), and to upstream scientific research tools, materials, and discoveries (Madey v. Duke, 2002 Of course in many ways these court decisions were the consequence of legislative changes in 1982, during which the CAFC was created, and the position of patent holders strengthened by a number of procedural changes in the courts. In a comparison of appeals cases from 1953 to 1978 and from 1982 to 1990, the share of District Court decisions finding validity and infringement that were upheld by the higher court increased from 62 percent to 90 percent. Decisions of invalidity and no infringement were reversed 12 percent of the time before the Federal Circuit's creation and 18 percent afterward (Lerner 1995) . Moreover, the rate of preliminary injunctions increased dramatically (Lanjouw and Lerner 1998) . In a recent study using modern time series methods and taking account of the sequence of appeals decisions, Henry and Turner (2006) find robust evidence that the CAFC was less likely to invalidate patents than earlier courts but no less likely to affirm or reverse infringement findings. Some commentators have argued that a specialized patent court is more likely to be "captured" by the patent bar and those whose interests are served by strong patents of any kind, and that this outcome should be viewed as a cautionary tale when considering creation of a similar court for European patents.
The early 1980s was also the period when the well-known Bayh-Dole Act passed into the law, leading to the emergence of new players such as many universities and public research institutions, as well as an increase in activity at institutions that had already been patenting some of their research results. Although the impact and importance of this Act remains controversial in the United States (e. g., see Mowery et al., 2004) , it has been seen as a model by many other countries who are anxious to improve their record of commercializing university research and a number of them have experimented with similar changes (Geuna and Nesta, 2006) . A full discussion of the issues associated with the patenting of university research outputs is beyond the scope of this article and the reader is referred to Wright, Siegel, and Veugelers (this volume).
As discussed earlier, the economic view of patents is that they represent a tradeoff between the costs of granting limited market power to firms versus the benefits of encouraging innovation, in much the same way that competition policy is designed to maintain a balance between the costs of increased market power from concentration and the benefits of scale efficiencies. It should come as no surprise then that patent policy and competition policy occasionally are misaligned, and increasingly need to be looked at simultaneously.
In the area of competition policy, from 1981 onward there has been a marked evolution in the attitude of the U. S. Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission toward business conduct involving patents, resulting in a much more nuanced and pro-patent position (FTC, 2003) . Following changes to practice in 1981 and 1988, in 1995 the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission jointly issued Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, declaring that "the Agencies do not presume that intellectual property creates market power in the antitrust context" and intellectual property licensing is "generally pro-competitive." Similarly, new licensing guidelines were issued by the European Commission in 2004 that provide a safe harbor for many licensing agreements, especially those involving firms with low market shares. For useful comparisons of the two sets of provisions and a discussion of the differences, see Gilbert (2004) and Delrahim (2004) . The Korean and Japanese Fair Trade Commissions also have what amounts to a "rule of reason" approach to the regulation of such agreements.
Taken together, these changes all add up to a considerable strengthening of patent holder rights and broadening of the reach of the patent system. As I summarize in the next section, the response to these changes on the part of private firms has been dramatic.
(ii) Strategic response
The most obvious response to these changes in the U. S. patent system was the increase in patenting across many sectors, leading to a doubling of U.S. patent applications and grants during the 10 year period between 1992 and 2002. In Hall (2005) , I used a simple time series analysis to show that the time series of aggregate patent applications in the US displayed a structural break in 1984, with the annual growth rate increasing from zero to over six per cent. Such a growth rate will produce a doubling in twelve years. I also showed that most of the growth was due to increased patenting by firms in the information and communication technology (ICT) sectors, which is consistent with the view that much of it is for defensive reasons (Arora et al., 2001; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Hicks et al., 2001) . At the same time, the contribution of increased university and public research institution patenting to growth was relatively small, not because such patenting did not increase, but because the share remains small. From a regional perspective, over half the growth was due to inventors in the United States, one third to those in Asia and the small remainder to inventors in Europe. Thus the growth in patenting at the USPTO through 2002 was driven by the behavior of the ICT sector in the U.S. and Asia.
Recent data from WIPO confirm that this growth trend is worldwide (WIPO 2007) A number of other behavioral changes have accompanied this increase in patenting: slightly higher renewal rates, more frequent assertion of patents, a doubling of U.S. District Court patent suits, 1988-2001, and some evidence that the probability of a suit per patent has increased recently (Bessen and Meurer, 2005) . The complexity of patents in terms of number of claims and citations of prior art has grown, and patentees tend to invest more in the process of application and examination. In testimony before Congress, the current Director of the USPTO, Jon Dudas, reported that more than 100,000 of the 355,000 patent applications filed in 2004 were continuations of applications that had been previously reviewed by an examiner. He also reports on the problem of "super-sized" applications submitted by a minority of applicants (7 per cent of the applications account for 25 per cent of the claims examined; some are submitted on CDROMs with thousands of claims).
The supersize phenomenon has also been documented elsewhere by van Zeebroeck et al. (2006) , who report that applications of over thousand pages are now frequently filed at the European Patent Office and other patent offices around the world, and several applications have even reached 100,000 pages or up to 20,000 claims. They look at the sources of the surge in the number and size of patent applications and conclude that a major factor driving the growth is the diffusion of the US patent application model via the PCT. Nagaoka (2006) reports that the number of claims per patent application in Japan tripled between 1990 and 2003.
In addition, many critics have argued that the sheer volume of patent applications threatens to degrade the quality of issued patents or lengthen the backlog or both. On the backlog there is no doubt. In April 2005, Dudas reported that pendency in data-processing technologies stood at three years and growing, and that without intervention, the current backlog of applications awaiting first review could double from 500,000 to a million in the next 5 years. The European Patent Office grant lags were already long and are getting longer. During the 6 years between 1998 and 2006 the waiting time for examination at the Japanese Patent Office increased from 19 to 26 months (Nagaoka 2006) .
Finding hard evidence of a decline in quality is more difficult, although a number of legal scholars and practitioners have been vocal on the subject (e.g., Barton, 2000; Hunt, 1999; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Kingston, 2001; Lunney, 2001 ). There are several reasons to believe that quality (especially the application of the nonobviousness and novelty criteria of patentability) has suffered as the number of applications has grown. First, the number of patent examiners has not kept pace with the increase in workload represented by the increased number and growing complexity of the applications. Second, in the United States there does seem to have been a dilution of the application of the nonobviousness standard in biotechnology (due to court decisions) and some limitations on applying it properly to business method patent applications, among other reasons being the absence of adequate written prior art documents. Recent changes in the treatment of genomic and business methods application were introduced at the USPTO (the second pair of eyes for business methods patents and the requirement of a specific application or use of a new gene sequence) that resulted in a slowing down of patent grants in those fields, suggesting that the previous bar may have been set too low.
During the U.S. Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice hearings on the patent system and antitrust policy in 2002, a number of industry representatives expressed concerns about the difficulty of negotiating the patent thicket in their area and the risk of being "held-up" ex post by a patent on a technology that was only a small component of their product. This complaint was heard largely from those in the complex product industries (the ICT sector), such as Robert Barr, then Vice-President for Intellectual Property and Worldwide Patent Counsel at Cisco Corporation. He described two types of problems faced by firms in the sector: the first being the large stockpiling of patents necessary as a defensive measure against others in the industry and the second being the threat posed by small entities that have nothing at risk themselves and may not even be producers. On the first, Barr says the following:
"My observation is that patents have not been a positive force in stimulating innovation at Cisco. …….. Everything we have done to create new products would have been done even if we could not obtain patents on the innovations and inventions contained in these products. …..The only practical response to this problem of unintentional and sometimes unavoidable patent infringement is to file hundreds of patents each year ourselves, so that we can have something to bring to the table in cross-licensing negotiations. …..The time and money we spend on patent filings, prosecution, and maintenance, litigation and licensing could be better spent on product development and research leading to more innovation."
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On the second problem (that of being attacked ex post by a small entity that does not face much risk of infringement itself):
"……….stockpiling patents does not really solve the problem of unintentional patent infringement through independent development. If we are accused of infringement by a patent holder who does not make and sell products, or who sells in much smaller volume than we do, our patents do not have sufficient value to the other party to deter a lawsuit or reduce the amount of money demanded by the other company."
13
The first of the problems Barr describes is clearly a case of mutually assured destruction that leaves the firms in question no better (and no worse) off than if they were not accumulating massive numbers of patents for defensive purposes, and yet at the same time is a very costly strategy. Increasing the administrative costs of patents to firms or reforms within the industry itself to discourage this behavior would seem to be the obvious solution, since it would be in the interest of all firms involved to reduce spending on this activity. However, the second problem is more controversial: the small entities that assert patents in this way may have legitimate claims to ownership of some of the technology in a large firm's product. Some observers have even questioned how common this kind of patent assertion is. Nevertheless, the IT industry in general has been very concerned about these kinds of threats and their consequences for the incentives to invest in complex technologies that might potentially incorporate a piece of technology which leads to a dispute that cannot be resolved by cross-licensing.
Concern over patent holdup is especially relevant in the case of standards technologies, which are difficult to invent around and which are very important in this sector (Shapiro 2001) . This problem has caught the attention of many firms worldwide because of the highly publicized and controversial litigation over DRAM standards initiated by Rambus against firms such as Hynix, Samsung, and Micron Technology. The litigation is over patents whose applications were filed 12 Barr (2002), pp. 675-677. 13 Op. cit., pp. 679-680.
while Rambus was participating in the standards-setting committee (JEDEC). The European Patent Office overturned the one of the relevant patents in an opposition case and US Federal Trade Commission initiated a successful complaint over their behavior in this case, but some of the cases are still in the courts. 14 Nagaoka (2006) reports that the practice of applying for patents after a standard has been chosen is widespread: using US and worldwide patent family data, he shows that 50 per cent of the essential patents covering the MPEG2, DVD, and W-CDMA standards were applied for after the specifications were set.
The final area where changes in patenting practice and IP management has raised concern in policy circles is the increased patenting of "research tools" and its consequences. Walsh et al (2003) interviewed some 70 players in the biotechnology research area and found that by and large intellectual property in biotechnology is being managed relatively successfully. Because of increasing patent assertion and the extension of patentability to life forms and gene sequences, the associated costs of research are somewhat higher and research can sometimes be slowed, but it is rarely blocked altogether. There are, however, occasional cases of restricted access to foundational discoveries and to some diagnostic genetic tests. A number of "working solutions" have evolved, including negotiated licenses and royalty payments. Patents are also circumvented by inventing around them, using substitute research tools, and locating research activity offshore. Institutional responses include the National Institutes of Health guidelines encouraging research grantees to facilitate access to patented research tools and the steps taken by several research organizations to place results in the public domain, where they become patent-defeating prior art.
VI. The TRIPS controversy
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement that was incorporated into the charter of the World Trade Organization in 1994 essentially sets uniform patent standards throughout the membership of the WTO, although in the case of developing countries it allows considerable delay in adopting these standards. 15 The agreement was negotiated without a great deal of economic input, and the idea of uniform standards has proved very controversial among economists. The most obvious argument against the principle behind TRIPS is that the tradeoff between the costs of market power granted by a patent and the benefit of the innovation incentive is not likely to be uniform across different development levels so that a one-size-fits-all rule is far from optimal. A secondary argument is that for a small less-developed country, the fixed cost of operating a patent office takes resources and trained personnel away from more productive activities. Analysis is also complicated by the fact that the optimal policy needs to be determined in an open economy setting where costs are incurred locally but benefits may spill globally. Grossman and Lai (2004) analyzes a simple version of the problem, with only two countries (developed or North and less developed or South). In a non-cooperative equilibrium, North will choose a stronger patent policy under reasonable conditions (North's market is at least as large as South's and its R&D capability is greater). The global welfare optimum has multiple outcomes, but without transfers, the outcomes which favor the North are those with longer patents in the South. Using a similar setup, Scotchmer (2004) shows that harmonization generally strengthens IP protection in all countries, and that because there are no similar institutions to manage the benefits of public support for innovation, the tendency is towards too much protection and too little public spending with respect to a (global) social optimum.
A useful survey of the empirical evidence on the incentive effects of patents in the developing country context is provided by Branstetter (2004) . He finds that there is little evidence of a strong incentive effect for domestic innovators, but some acceleration in the diffusion of advanced technology by multinational firms (who feel more protected in the presence of a functioning patent system). Although this result suggests that spillover effects from FDI may be enhanced, it also means that the monopoly rent from a given innovation has been enhanced, essentially promoting innovation in the developed world rather than the developing world.
There is also the previously cited evidence of Qian (2007) with respect to pharmaceuticals, which shows that the incentive effects of patents depend on the development level of the country. The historical experience of the U.S. in the early 19 th century (when national treatment was not available to foreign inventors) and Taiwan in the 20 th century (where patents were unimportant until the mid-1980s, after a certain level of industrial development had been reached) confirms that where technology imitation is an important tool of catching up, it may be optimal to wait before introducing strong patent protection.
VII. Conclusion
This article has offered a brief tour of patent systems, past, present, and immediate future. As one reflects on the results of economic research in this area, one is struck by the not inconsiderable tension between what we know about patents as an innovation incentive and the general thrust of contemporary patent policy. This tension is visible in two main areas: the expansion of patenting activity in several dimensions (subject matter coverage, type of patenting entity, and geographic) and its "one-size-fits-all" nature.
Thus, although the research I have surveyed does not indicate an overwhelmingly important role for patents in encouraging innovation except in a few sectors, there is no doubt that the general policy stance of many governments is to encourage firms, individuals, and research organizations to learn about the patent system and apply for patents. To cite one example, the European Union has had an initiative in place for several years designed to educate small and medium-sized enterprises in the use of the patent system. A number of countries have adopted measures to encourage patenting and technology licensing by universities and governmental research organizations, modeling them on the well-known Bayh-Dole Act in the United States (Geuna and Nesta, 2006) . And of course the TRIPS agreement clearly was intended to raise the level of patenting activity in developing countries by guaranteeing a minimum level of protection throughout the global economy. At the level of the individual agent, this is undoubtedly the right strategy, even if social welfare is not necessarily increased by a massive increase in patenting activity.
Given the importance of knowledge assets in modern-day economies, some of the increase in patenting and its importance that we have observed is obviously due to increased inventive activity. It is unlikely that patent systems will disappear or be completely replaced by alternative incentive systems for eliciting this kind of activity. Nevertheless, one has to ask whether the marginal scientist/engineer is best employed doing R&D or examining patents. That is, would society as a whole be better off if the inventive step requirement for a patent were raised, leading to fewer patents but without discouraging real innovations.
The evidence surveyed here also leads inexorably to the conclusion that a significant problem for policy makers is the heterogeneity of responses to the system, a heterogeneity that is firmly grounded in the heterogeneity of technology and its development. The debate presently taking place in the United States over patent reform highlights the problem: pharmaceutical firms, among others, find that the present system works well for them and are opposed to any changes designed to improve its operation for firms in "complex" technology industries such as telecommunications and computing. ICT firms, on the other hand, seem to view the system as a necessary evil, requiring costly investments in patent portfolio building for defensive purpose while using other methods to secure returns to their own innovations. Many of these firms support reforms to the system that are designed to mitigate the problems which arise when a product contains many minor inventions and relies on a number of standards that may be covered by patents.
In spite of the fact that the cost and nature of invention clearly varies across technological field, patent law and international agreements essentially agree that the same level of patent protection should be available for all technologies without discrimination. However, as Burk and Lemley (2002) point out, application of the law by patent offices and the courts can lead to substantial variation across technologies in practice. Given the likely response of firms and inventors to attempts to define statutory differences in treatment across technologies, this type of flexibility is perhaps the best we can do. But the problem of heterogeneity and whether there is something that can be done about it remains a subject for future policy research. Patents Granted Worldwide
